A Culture of Ethical Whistleblowing
For a culture of ethical whistleblowing to develop, workers must be clear on what kind of conduct is legitimate and what is not. Leaking is only "whistleblowing" if it exposes wrongdoing, and in general the wrongdoing must be severe enough to justify any collateral harm that might result. Where there are doubts, they should probably be resolved in favor of keeping quiet, since a whistleblower may not foresee all the consequences of talking, especially in national security areas. (Where, say, the Department of Agriculture is concerned, this may be less true). 6 Gallup.com, Trust In Government, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/5392/Trust-Government.aspx. See also Paul Steinhauser, CNN Poll, Trust In Government At All-Time Low, CNN.com, August 8, 2014, available at http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2014/08/08/cnn-poll-trust-in-government-at-all-time-low-2/comment-page-3/.
("Just 13% of Americans say the government can be trusted to do what is right always or most of the time, with just over three-quarters saying only some of the time and one in 10 saying they never trust the government, according to the poll.") Does ethical whistleblowing require efforts to address the problem internally to the agency before going public? That's a notion that seems appealing, and that might have some role, but given the tendency to identify even people who raise problems internally as "troublemakers," 7 a prudent whistleblower who notices something serious enough to go public with might well fear that raising it internally would result in reprisals, surveillance, or other measures that might make it more difficult to go public later.
Ethical whistleblowing, I submit, does require an ethic of minimalism: That is, the material made public should be the material needed to expose wrongdoing, and no more than is needed to do so. This is one area where Edward Snowden has been criticized by other whistleblowers. Prior NSA whistleblower William Binney, for example, who approves of Snowden's decision to go straight to the press because internal appeals, in Binney's experience, were futile, nonetheless thinks Snowden went too far:
Binney criticizes Snowden's leaking of documents not directly related to the NSA's surveillance of American citizens and violation of constitutional rights. Binney believes that the NSA is vital to national security but has been become unmoored due to technological advances that vastly extend its capabilities and leadership that has no use for limits on government power. "They took that program designed [to prevent terrorist attacks] and used it to spy on American citizens and everyone else in the world," flatly declares Binney.
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Whatever the merits of this criticism in Snowden's case, this principle of minimalism seems a good one, aimed at minimizing collateral damage from exposing bad behavior.
So to be legitimate, a "whistleblowing" disclosure must be (1) related to genuine wrongdoing, and wrongdoing that is severe enough to justify the inevitable collateral damage that will occur; (2) about wrongdoing that is unlikely to be corrected via internal channels; and (3) as narrow as feasible under the circumstances, to minimize collateral damage. 
Crime and Justification
How to deal with the threat of criminal prosecution? On the one hand, disclosure of classified material is a crime, and often with good reason. On the other hand, over-classification is a legendary problem within the federal government, and secrecy is used to cover up governmental misconduct often enough that one cannot simply assume that every leak is inherently damaging.
A whistleblower protection statute with real teeth would allow whistleblowers to defend against criminal prosecution as well as firing or on-the-job retaliation on the basis that their leaking was justified. Perhaps whistleblowers should be able to plead a statutory defense akin to common law necessity, arguing to a jury that the disclosure was necessary to prevent a greater harm to the public. Thus when charged with violating laws relating to espionage or the handling of classified material, a whistleblower could argue that his or her action to publicize official misbehavior was, as described above, related to genuine wrongdoing that was unlikely to be addressed through internal channels, and that the data released was no more than reasonably necessary to draw public attention to the problem. Just as "good faith" immunity shields government officials from liability in many circumstances because that immunity is regarded as essential to the performance of their jobs, so too a sort of good faith immunity for whistleblowers may be essential to ensuring that the federal government does not overstep its legal bounds. In addition, the presence of such rules defining "good" whistleblowing might actually make it easier to prosecute "bad" leakers who don't conform to the ethical whistleblowing definitions.
In addition, increased power -and independence -for departmental inspectors general might be a good idea. To the extent that such watchdogs could be trusted to investigate wrongdoing on their own, the need for whistleblowing by employees would be reduced. At present, according to the inspectors themselves, that's not the case. 
Conclusion
Leaks are inevitable. So, it seems, is a government too large and complex to be overseen properly by either the President or Congress. Rather than trying to overcome either of these
